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The Development of the Turbojet Engine in
Britain and Germany as a Lens for Future
Developments
Ethan Z Cansler1
Dr. Robert Bond, Advisor
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, TN, 37916

I. Introduction
jet engine is indisputably one of the greatest technological advances to emerge
THE
from the twentieth century, both in technical and societal terms. Never before had
flight at such speeds been possible, and in time, the jet engine came to connect the world
more tightly than ever before. Like many developments that preceded and would follow
it, the advance of gas turbine propulsion was spurred by military needs rather than by
the investigations of pure science. On the eve of the Second World War, both Britain and
Germany (or, more accurately, a few Britons and a greater number of Germans)
embarked upon independent courses of research, development, and discovery. Both
groups hoped to deliver a decisive wartime tactical advantage to their country’s airborne
forces, though neither power was able to enjoy substantial (let alone decisive)
deployment of the developed technology by war’s end. What make the individual stories,
compared to each other, so fascinating are their many stark differences, superimposed
against their remarkably similar end results. In some key regards, the two histories
could not be more different—the two primary inventors received wholly different levels
of support from their governments and their nation’s industrial establishments, and
pursued fundamentally different designs in some regards—yet both nations developed
functional jet engines that were deployed in combat roles at roughly the same time. In
the retrospective course of any technological development, it is common to speculate as
to what might have been if only ‘x’ variable had been different, without the ability to
actually confirm any hypothesis. The development of the turbojet engine, by contrast,
allows for more viable ‘what-if’ statements due to our ability to objectively compare
what happened in each program. Though they certainly do not provide for an
omniscient examination, the stories of the first jet engines are an unusually good base
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from which to build such an analysis due to the fact that they happened in almost
perfect isolation and with many variables altered.
Development of the turbojet engine carried one other characteristic: speed was
understood to be of the essence by both parties, in the interest of wartime necessity.
Nearly any idea that is good enough will eventually be taken up and fully developed; the
analysis undertaken in this paper assumes that the development in question is under a
time constraint. The ultimate goal of this paper is to use the objective comparisons
derived from the British and German development histories in order to make
generalized recommendations applicable to any new technological development with a
bearing on national security and requirement of expedience. More specifically, this
paper does not seek to advise on how to make the best or most optimized finished
product, but rather on how to use historically demonstrated methods to field a
functional device in the shortest possible time frame.

II. Technical Overview
A. General turbojet description
It will serve the following discussion to review the basic components and
operation of a subsonic turbojet engine, the simplest and oldest variant of jet engine,
which still forms the core of most of our modern ‘jet’ engines. Air first enters the
diffuser, which decelerates the flow, nearly isentropically, prior to its entry to the
compressor. In the compressor, the air’s pressure is increased, with a corresponding
increase in temperature and decrease in volume, and the air is then delivered to the
combustor where fuel is sprayed in and the fuel-air mixture is combusted. The hot
exhaust gases are passed through a turbine (essentially a compressor in reverse) which
extracts the power required to run the compressor at the front of the engine. Finally, the
hot gases are passed through a converging-diverging nozzle in which they are
supersonically expanded to the design exit pressure. With regard to the thrust equation,
̇(

), where Vjet refers to the velocity of the air stream exiting the nozzle and

V∞ refers to the engine’s velocity relative to the surrounding air, turbojets generate their
considerable thrust by the second term rather than by a high mass flow rate ̇ (such as
is seen with traditional propeller-driven craft).
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While it is natural to envision the components as being arrayed in a linear fashion
— diffuser→compressor→burner→turbine→nozzle, such that the flow is always moving
in the same direction as it passes through the engine — it is not strictly required. It is
actually possible to axially condense the layout such that the flow reverses direction
twice as it passes through the engine; such engines are referred to as “reversecombustion”. For the sake of minimizing drag, this is not done today, but the first
British turbojet series was designed to do so.
As one might imagine, temperature is one of the most important operational
considerations for two engine components: the combustor and turbine. Of these two, the
turbine is the more critical due to the more intimate contact that the flow has with the
metal elements. While overall efficiency of any engine increases with combustion
temperature, the upper temperature bound of a turbojet engine is dictated by the
melting temperature of the turbine blades, as they are directly exposed to the hot
exhaust gases from the combustor. Those familiar with modern turbines will know that
the problem has been ameliorated today to an extent by creative engineering of the
blades via both metallurgical processes, such as single-crystal blades, and the use of
bleed air from the compressor to form a thin film of (relatively) cool air around the
blades, but only the latter technique had begun to enjoy rudimentary use during the
Second World War.
B. Main design differences encountered
The bulk of the design differences between the first English and German jets can
be summarized in a few binary design choices.
1) Compressors: There are two types of compressor designs possible: axial and
centrifugal. Axial compressors keep the flow moving, as their name describes,
axially as it passes through the compressor. They accomplish this by stacking
together successive stages, each composed of one rotor and one stator row of
blades. The rotor stages are powered by the turbine and all spin at the same
angular velocity. When the rotor stages perform work on the flow, it is referred to
as impulse, while when the stator stages perform work on the flow, it is called
reaction. Centrifugal compressors, by contrast, have flow entering at the axial
center and then accelerate it radially by the spinning of the rotor. In contrast to
3

axial compressors, where the exit flow is at approximately the same radial
distance from the engine’s central axis as when it entered, the exit flow from a
centrifugal compressor is at the (relatively greater) radial extremity of the
engine’s interior and requires redirection before it can be passed on to the
burner. However, centrifugal compressors generally require fewer stages to
achieve the same compression ratio relative to axial compressors, as each stage
can tolerate a higher stage pressure ratio, making the compressor shorter (albeit
fatter). Perhaps most importantly for the purposes of initial development,
centrifugal compressors are easier to design and were already well-understood by
engineers

of

the

day

in

the

context

of

aero-engine

superchargers.

An important corollary effect of the choice of compressor type is the design of the
airframe. The engines that result from use of radially-compact axial compressors
can generally be slung under a wing without much added design effort, meaning
that the only added complexity for a jet-powered airframe design was to make the
structure capable of withstanding high-speed flight. In the case of centrifugal
compressors, however, the engine bulk is so great that, for drag to not be
excessive, an airframe must be designed around the intended engine. Typically,
centrifugally-compressed engines are either placed within the fuselage itself with
an air intake built into the plane’s nose (for a single-engine configuration) or built
into the wings (for a dual-engine configuration). As mentioned before, two types
of component arrangement are possible: straight-flow and reverse-flow. The
choice of compressor type further influences the choice of component
arrangement, as discussed previously. The selection of an axial flow compressor
invariably dictates a straight-flow configuration in the interest of minimizing
frontal area and drag. A centrifugal flow compressor, however, can lend itself to
either arrangement; the drag penalty imposed by a reverse-flow arrangement is
relatively less if a centrifugal compressor is already present, and the reduced
overall length may serve to offset that penalty depending on the engine’s
intended use.
2) Another design choice regards the type of combustor used. There were two types
of combustors available for use: the can-type and the annular-type. A can
combustor is composed of a series of cans placed side-by-side in such a manner
4

as to form a ring around the turbojet’s axis. Can combustors are relatively easy to
build, test, and maintain, as modifications or maintenance may be performed on
a single can at a time rather than on the combustor assembly as a whole.
However, the use of a can combustor does create more possible points of failure,
since each can is a self-contained combustor with distinct components. The most
significant disadvantages of using can combustors are higher weight and greater
total pressure loss relative to annular combustors. The higher weight is a result of
the greater material cost to construct multiple individual cans versus one annular
combustor, and the total pressure loss is due to the inefficiencies inherent in
more complicated flow paths. Annular combustors, on the other hand, are axially
symmetric and create a single zone for combustion to take place in, with an
advantage of more uniform exit flow for the turbine to interact with. They are
simpler to initially design, but more difficult to test and maintain. They also tend
to be shorter than can combustors, since the continuous combustion zone offers
relatively more combustion volume per unit length of combustor; this also
contributes to their lower relative weight.

III. Development Paths
Here it is time to delve into the stories of how each country’s first turbojet came
to be. As mentioned previously, the two developments took place in nearly total
isolation from one another.
A. Britain
First, the British development will be considered. The original British turbojet is
typically referred to as the ‘Whittle engine’ or ‘Whittle Unit’ after its creator, Frank
Whittle. It can be fairly said that Whittle pursued the idea for a turbojet engine before
anyone else; though impossible to say that he ‘had’ the idea first, the evidence of patent
activity is indisputable.
Whittle first brought his research to the attention of British authorities on aeroengines in 1929, hoping to secure funding for its further development. British interests,
immediately prior to the Second World War, may be generally characterized as wedded
to the status quo. The governing and influencing bodies of aviation in Britain were
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reasonably convinced that piston engines were the only viable source of airplane
propulsion available at present or in the foreseeable future, in large part because that
was all that they were familiar with (and all that had ever worked up until then). The
bodies believed, correctly, that improvements could still be made to piston engines, and
that is where their attentions were focused. Their bias is, to a degree, understandable, in
light of the vast amounts of funding and man-hours of effort which had been dedicated
to developing piston engines as the technical standard of aircraft propulsion. However,
the men in authoritative positions tended to be unwilling to acknowledge the possibility
of jet propulsion as a successor to piston engines; worse, one man may have deliberately
diminished the value of Whittle’s work in the interest of his own. The greatest weakness
of the British air establishment, in the case of the turbojet, was their automatic reliance
on ‘experts’—not a bad thing, in and of itself, except for when a development is so
different from the status quo that there are none or few experts to speak of. The most
influential body was the Royal Aircraft Establishment in Farnborough, which advised
the RAF on technical matters. The RAE, when initially approached by Whittle in 1929,
in turn approached a man named Alan Griffith, who had recently published a paper
detailing the use of a gas turbine as an airplane powerplant (in most regards, what
Whittle was proposing, and indeed basing his own work off of in part). However, Griffith
in 1929 returned an unfavorable review of Whittle’s work, citing an error in his
calculations, and generally claiming that the design was too simple and too inefficient to
be practical. He further dismissed Whittle’s design due to its reliance on metals capable
of withstanding higher temperatures than could be presently achieved. Whittle, though,
was not a fool. He knew that while the materials were not available yet, it was almost
certain that they would be developed in the very near future in the course of
metallurgical research. Taken by itself, the worst complaint that can be levied against
Griffith’s report is an abject lack of imagination; he may have legitimately believed that
Whittle’s work was flawed. Unfortunately, the RAE accepted the opinion of one man at
face value and used that as justification to disregard Whittle’s work.
Whittle was understandably discouraged but remained convinced of the validity
of his idea—indeed, he subsequently discovered a second error in his calculations which
served to largely cancel the first—and continued to pour effort into his idea for several
years in his spare time as he progressed through the RAF officer progam. A fellow officer
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and friend in the RAF who had formerly been a patent examiner persuaded him to
patent his idea in 1930. In 1932, he enrolled in the Officer’s Engineering Course per RAF
procedure and performed extremely well; his performance was so exemplary what when
he requested that he be allowed to study at Cambridge (a customary RAF program for
qualified officers which had been recently discontinued) his superiors allowed it. In
1937, he graduated from Peterhouse in Cambridge with first-class honors, a further
testament to his ability. Though the program into which he enrolled was nominally two
years long, he had been permitted to take an extra year by the RAF to further develop
his studies. While at Cambridge in 1935, he had formed an arrangement with Rolf
Dudley-Williams and James Tinling in the interest of furthering the development of his
turbojet design. At the same time, his original patent came up for renewal at the sum of
£5; while this sounds trivial by today’s standards, by a reckoning of affordability defined
by the average earnings of the day in the UK, this amounted to over £700 in 2010
money, quite a considerable sum for a man who was a university student at the time.
Thoroughly unable to pay the fee to renew his patent, and even questioning its worth,
Whittle allowed the patent to lapse. However, thanks to the efforts of Williams and
Tinling, within the year the investment firm of Falk & Partners met with Whittle and
proved willing to back him following a third-party technical review of his design.
By early 1936, Power Jets Limited was created in a power-sharing arrangement
with Whittle, Williams, Tinling, the Air Ministry, and Falk & Partners. In July, Whittle
graduated from Cambridge and was given permission by the RAF to take a postgraduate
year to both continue his studies and further work on his engine. Despite being involved
in the arrangement (as a consequence of Whittle still being an RAF officer) the Air
Ministry was still unwilling to put forth any funding. The money raised (£2,000) from
Falk & Partners proved enough, though, to engage British Thompson-Houston (BTH) to
build both a prototype and an associated facility in which to test it in a BTH factory in
Rugby. By 1937, development was quite well along and within budget. Concurrent with
the agreement which formed Power Jets Ltd, the Air Ministry had once more solicited
the opinion of Griffith on Whittle’s refined design. However, he did not respond until
March 1937; this time, he gave a more favorable opinion, but still failed to recommend
the design. As it turned out, Griffith was by that time pursuing a turbojet of his own,
which inescapably raises questions regarding a conflict of interest. In any case, Griffith’s
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engine never flew during the war. Unfortunately, despite the unquestionable progress of
Whittle’s engine by March 1937, the Aeronautical Research Committee (ARC, another
advisory body with its own funding to give) decided to fund Griffith’s engine rather than
Whittle’s. This perceived lack of confidence by aero-engine authorities in turn spurred
Falk & Partners to refuse funding beyond £5,000 to Whittle. Nonetheless, in April 1937
the prototype engine (dubbed the Whittle Unit or WU for short) ran successfully under
its own power. Henry Tizard, the chair of the ARC, was himself impressed and was able
to convince the Air Ministry to contribute £5,000 of government money, which was a
shot in the arm for Whittle’s development. The money proved to be elusive, though, and
did not in fact show up until the following year, 1938. This was problematic, since their
extant funding from Falk & Partners ran dry in July 1937. The investment group agreed
to find more funding, but it failed to materialize and the agreement between Falk &
Partners and the other investors fell apart. In default, the investment group’s shares
went to the other investors, who proceeded on. Work proceeded in Rugby under the
joint auspices of Power Jets Ltd and BTH until January 1938, when the combined
success and danger of the work merited that it be transferred to an unused BTH facility
in nearby Lutterworth. With regard to funding, BTH determined that the enterprise was
worth investing £2,500 of its own money, and the promised money from the Air
Ministry did at last come during March 1938. Alas, the long-awaited blessing of Air
Ministry funding proved to be something of a curse as well, since the government money
imposed the Official Secrets Act on the whole enterprise. This, in turn, made it next to
impossible to seek out further private funding—quite a problem, considering that the Air
Ministry was making no guarantees with regard to the future funding which would be
required to develop the engine fully.
Indeed, by June of 1939 Whittle’s enterprise was once more in danger of financial
collapse; thankfully, the work had produced a device impressive enough that the Air
Ministry was willing to buy it from Power Jets in the interest of financing a flight-ready
unit, the W.1. By April 1940, Power Jets had produced a preliminary W.1 and a followup
W.2 and the Air Ministry was enthusiastic enough to request that three companies
prepare production lines capable of producing 3,000 engines per month by 1942. Of the
three, only Rover accepted the contract. As Power Jets’ new air industry partner, they
set up a working laboratory in an unused factory in 1941. However, Rover was
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uncooperative and assumed a general attitude of superiority, while simultaneously
failing to deliver parts of sufficient quality. By the end of 1941, it became increasingly
clear that the partnership was ill-functioning. Unbeknownst to Whittle, Rover had
secretly started work on a W.2 variant of its own—with the Air Ministry’s knowledge and
approval, no less. By April of 1942, Whittle became aware of Rover’s duplicity and the
joint project nearly derailed. Despite how incensed he was, along with Power Jets as a
whole, cooperation struggled on, in large part due to his conviction that his project was
vital to the war effort. Thankfully, in January of 1943, Rolls Royce bought out Rover’s
involvement in the turbojet project and immediately kicked testing and production into
high gear. It is worth noting that Rolls Royce was a more natural fit than Rover for jet
engine manufacture, as they already possessed a fully-fledged supercharger division,
which lent itself well to turbojet work. By October 1943, production units of the W.2B
were coming off Rolls Royce’s assembly lines at last, dubbed the Rolls Royce Welland.
These engines were placed in waiting Gloster Meteor airframes, and the first British jet
squadron was formed in late July of 1944. No jet-to-jet battle was experienced during
the war, but they were effective in bringing down V-1 bombs heading for London.
The development timeline of Whittle’s engine was not intended to be laborious,
but rather to illustrate both the adverse environment his work was subjected to until the
latter years of the war, as well as the strength of his perseverance for the sake of a
turbojet engine for Britain. While Whittle did have significant technical hurdles to
overcome in the course of developing his engine (most notably the burner design) these
were secondary to his funding problems. Acquisition of development money was far
more of a struggle than it should have been as a result of an unaccommodating
institutional system. During the war years, he suffered two mental breakdowns due to
stress, one in 1940 and another in 1944. During the war, he would at times maintain 80
hour work weeks, sniffing Benzedrine during the day to stay awake and taking sleeping
pills at night. It is worth considering that Whittle was a commissioned RAF officer and
could have probably walked away from his project and returned to regular duty; a lessdedicated man likely would have. In time, the W.2B variant originally pursued by Rover
in secret, called by Rolls Royce the Derwent, would supplant the Welland, but
throughout the war only the Welland engine, a direct product of Whittle’s work, would
see service in the Gloster Meteor.
9

B. Germany
The German technological atmosphere prior to and throughout the Second World
War, in stark contrast to that of England, was highly favorable to emerging technologies
and in many cases able and willing to throw significant amounts of government funding
at promising developments such as the jet engine. Indeed, the case has been made that
Germany was at the opposite end of the pendulum stroke as England, which is to say
that it used too little restraint in the support of new ideas. Historians have often
commented on the over-exuberance of German policy on multiple topics, including
technical development; the jet engine was no exception to this pattern.
Though the German path to the development of the jet engine differed from that
of the British, there was a German inventor who filled a similar role as Whittle. His
name was Hans von Ohain, and he was a student at the University of Göttingen in 1935
when he began seriously working on his own ideas of jet propulsion. In 1936, he was
granted a patent in Germany for his idea, one year after Whittle’s in Britain. From the
beginning and throughout his work, von Ohain would enjoy one substantial advantage
over Whittle: he had money. Though by no means wealthy, von Ohain did enjoy
personal financial security even as a student due to his father’s position as a well-to-do
businessman in Berlin. Indeed, the first engine produced from his design was built by a
garage mechanic named Max Hahn (an automotive and railway engineer), who von
Ohain met in the course of having his sports car routinely serviced, from von Ohain’s
personal money. The engine’s manufacture cost nearly 1,000 Marks; using the historic
exchange rate for USD and adjusting for inflation, that translates to, at minimum,
~$32,000 in 2010 dollars. By contrast, Whittle couldn’t hope to afford a patent fee of
less than $1,500 in 2010 dollars. It is worth noting that von Ohain, while a brilliant
theoretician, was by his own admission “a physicist who really didn’t know what nuts
and bolts were.” Whittle, by contrast, had grown up with access to a machine shop and
was quite comfortable with both the design and manufacturing processes. However, von
Ohain was lucky enough to have access to Hahn, a superb craftsman.
This two-person team was enough to get Germany’s turbojet program underway
to such an extent that it was noticed and championed by the head of von Ohain’s
department at the university, Dr. Robert Pohl. This first engine, largely made of sheet
metal and generally dubbed the ‘garage engine’, suffered from several problems (it never
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ran under its own power and had a tendency to throw flames almost ten feet out the
back) but was still a compelling demonstration. Pohl wrote to Ernst Heinkel, head of the
Heinkel aircraft company, in 1936 in support of von Ohain’s work. Both von Ohain and
Hahn were soon employed by Heinkel, where they worked to further develop the
turbojet. The two men’s previous joint working arrangement split to a degree, with von
Ohain being assigned an aircraft engineer to help him translate his ideas into
munfacturable designs and Hahn being made head of the manufacturing team. Heinkel
quickly produced the HeS 1 (Heinkel-Strahltriebwerk, or Heinkel Jet Engine) which
was, like the garage engine prototype, made largely of sheet metal, although this time
with the addition of final machining. It ran on hydrogen in March 1937 and on gasoline
in September of the same year (Whittle’s had ran on gasoline in April). It is here worth
reflecting on the considerable benefit conferred on von Ohain’s work by his financial
ability: Whittle had agitated for his design in Britain since 1929, while von Ohain had
only began seriously thinking about his in 1935. Yet, both designs reached their first
great milestone, that of running under their own power, within a few months of each
other in 1937. From here, Germany’s program would generally overtake Britain’s due to
greater funding and industry support. By 1939, an He 178 (the first flying turbojetpowered plane) demonstrated the feasibility of turbojet propulsion to an audience of
Nazi officials including Hitler. Now convinced of the utility of turbojets, the German
equivalent to the British Air Ministry the Reichsluftfahrtministerium (RLM) began an
active effort to recruit established engine manufacturers to further develop the concept,
including BMW, Daimler-Benz, Bramo, and Junkers Motoren (Jumo). It is interesting
to note that Junkers had already made an abortive effort in secret to develop a turbojet
at about the same time Heinkel’s program was getting underway. Faced with failure, by
1939 they had already decided to return to the drawing board, taking with them the
lessons already learned. Beyond engine developers, the ministry sought manufacturers
to develop airframes suitable for turbojets, including Messerschmidt, Heinkel, and the
airframe division of Junkers.
Regarding engine development, Heinkel had been at an early disadvantage due to
a lack of engine manufacture and testing facilities (indeed, turbojets were the company’s
first foray into engine manufacture) and found itself pressured by the RLM to either
divest itself of the turbojet work or acquire a company with experience; the RLM did not
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favor supporting a company lacking prior experience developing engines (similar in
some ways to the position of the RAE regarding Whittle’s work). Fortunately, it was able
in 1939 to acquire the Hirth-Motorenwerke engine manufacturing firm and proceed
ahead. Of the other engine manufacturers approached, BMW and Jumo took up the call
initially. Fittingly, the first engine to receive an official RLM number was a Heinkel, the
HeS 8. It became known as the 109-001 in the Nazi numbering scheme. Other engines
among the first to be christened by the RLM included the BMW 109-002 and 109-003
as well as the Jumo 109-004. Fully discussing the developments of each of these engines
would be laborious, if instructive, so rather the focus will be on the overriding
difficulties which presented themselves to the German developers.
Where Whittle’s greatest source of trouble had been the acquisition of funding,
the Germans found themselves troubled by technical issues, often relating to their
choice of axial compressors. This was generally insisted upon by the RLM, with some
reasonable logic behind it. The demonstrator aircraft, the single-engine Heinkel 178,
had virtually no room for payload due to its bulky centrifugal compressor design. This is
much the same as the Gloster E.28/39 testbed used by Whittle. However, for some
reason the Germans do not appear to have considered the British solution of building a
centrifugally-compressed engine into the wings themselves; rather, they intended to
build twin-engine fighters with engines suspended from the wings. On multiple
occasions, German designers struggled with vibration issues emanating from axial
compressors. The problems were often not truly able to be solved during the war, but
merely minimized. Six months were spent on partially rectifying vibrational issues for
the compressor of the Jumo 004 alone in 1941, and such work would continue
intermittently through 1944. BMW’s 003 suffered less from specifically vibration issues,
but its compressors still had their own problems; the first prototype Me 262 flown on
BMW 003’s was nearly lost on its maiden flight due to dual compressor failure. Entirely
separate from vibrational considerations, the axial compressors suffered from an
additional problem in practice: since the rotational moment of inertia was relatively
small, if the throttle was ramped up too quickly the compressor could stall itself. The
combustion chambers could then overheat for lack of cooling airflow, and the engine
would be destroyed. This limitation meant that only highly-experienced pilots were able
to fly German turbojet-powered planes.
12

While British support for Whittle was halting, it did at least abstain from
backtracking. The Nazi Reich, however, was personality-driven and, as a result, at times
capricious. Early in the war in 1940, when optimism for victory verged on absolute
certainty, the head of the Luftwaffe Hermann Goering commanded that all military
development projects which would not reach completion within one year be
discontinued immediately in favor of pouring extant resources into the production of
mature aircraft designs. In 1941, Hitler himself repeated the demand, shortening the
timeframe to six months in the future. Clearly, turbojet developers quietly ignored these
decrees, perhaps having a clearer idea than the Fuhrer of the future requirements for the
war. However, it can hardly have been beneficial for development; it was likely not easy
to procure additional funding for projects that were supposed to have been canceled.
Thankfully, by late 1942 it was again permissible to perform long-term experimental
development work, likely due to the loss of German forward tactical momentum and
concurrent desire for stronger weapons. Later in the war the RLM itself began to waffle
between different funding priorities. The Messerschmitt 262 had been selected as the jet
fighter to pursue rather than the Heinkel 280 owing to its superior combat qualities.
Unfortunately, Messerschmitt was also arguably the premiere manufacturer of pistonpowered fighter planes; even in-house, these dual designs competed for resources. In
the larger world of RLM funding, there emerged wavering behavior over which plane to
prioritize—the revolutionary and powerful Me 262, or the pinnacle of conventional
piston-powered engineering, the Me 209. In June 1943, the RLM agreed to Willy
Messerschmitt’s suggestion that the Me 262 be made the top production priority and
dropped Me 209 development. Yet, a mere two months later in August, the RLM
decided that both planes should be produced and ordered a ramping-up to produce Me
209’s as well. At last in November 1943, the Me 209 plans were scrapped altogether, but
at a cost of misdirected resources that should have went to the Me 262 program.

IV. Retrospective Analysis
With the forgoing descriptions of the respective development processes in mind,
we will here consider what each nation did well and poorly. The analysis will be
restricted to institutional-level decisions, since the goal of the paper is to identify
courses of action by government and industrial bodies. Certainly, individual men played
13

crucial supportive roles in each nation, but it is impossible to predict where or when
such persons will fortuitously interact with a project.
A. Britain
The fortunes of Whittle and his project were largely determined by two British
bodies: the Air Ministry and the RAF. In fairness to the Air Ministry, it was focused on
winning the first war in which air superiority was a decisive factor. The body, though,
was far more often an obstacle than a help to Whittle, withholding funding based on the
opinion of one man, failing to prevent Rover’s obstinacy and arrogance from badly
delaying development, and being generally slow to respond. The Ministry’s support was
so meager that it is to a degree miraculous that Whittle did not abandon his idea
altogether in the early 1930’s.
The RAF, on the other end of the spectrum, deserves a great deal of
commendation for the quiet but huge role which it played in the turbojet’s development.
Though it never contributed funds or directly supported the engine in any way, it did an
outstanding job of supporting Whittle himself; he spent the war engrossed in
development and never saw combat, yet retired an Air Commodore, having been
promoted several times and continually permitted by his superiors to continue work on
what they recognized as a worthy project. Even prior to the war, the RAF allowed and
paid for Whittle to take a two-year engineering course at Cambridge, identifying his
substantial talent.
Somewhat confoundingly, when Britain nationalized Power Jets nearer to the end
of the war (March 1944) they also forbade the company from producing any more jet
engines; though this is explicable by pressure from the air industry, it still smacks of
poor decision-making. Many engineers simply left Power Jets at this point, seeing no
point in continuing work there. While the war was functionally over by that point from a
research and development perspective—no new work undertaken then would have
reached combat by the war’s end—this still very likely set back further turbojet
development.
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B. Germany
Subjecting German institutional behavior to the same analysis, it is harder to find
either overriding excellence or grounds for condemnation; rather, German industry can
be generally described as good but over-optimistic. It is more interesting to look at the
various aspects of the German government’s involvement, particularly compared to the
British government. While Whittle’s greatest obstacle was getting government funding,
the Nazi government funded every production engine developed during the war, as well
as several that did not reach production; in the RLM numbering system, which implied
use of government funding, at least sixteen numbers were used. The technology had had
to be first demonstrated to be viable under efforts funded by private companies, but
once that hurdle was passed, public funds were quickly made available and an overall
development scheme established (notwithstanding the issues with administrative
waffling discussed earlier). Indeed, speaking to the optimism of the Nazis, a
classification system was implemented in the late 1930’s concerning turbojet engines. It
possessed four classes, with the second class roughly twice the power of the first, the
third class roughly thrice the power of the first, etc. By the end of the war, only two
engines had reached production, the BMW 003 and Jumo 004; both were merely Class
1. Development had only begun on Class 2 engines. In fairness, the creation of the
classification system did not imply that the Nazis intended to produce a Class 4 engine
by the end of the war, but only indicated that they had the planning outlook of long-term
development—a full sixteen years, to be exact, rather longer than turned out to be
available. This mentality is quite logical from an R&D standpoint (and is in excellent
agreement with the stereotype of Germans as methodical and efficient pseudomachines). However, this forward-thinking mentality arguably hindered the turbojet
program’s combat-effectiveness, by spreading resources too thin and taking the long
view too often. Only in the latter two years of the war was the design process frozen for
the sole viable production engine at the time, the Jumo 004. By that point, German
industry actually began evincing a great deal of practical strategic ability, prioritizing
output over optimization. The Jumo 004 was simplified as much as possible to
accommodate severe shortages in alloying metals such as nickel and chromium which
were necessary to produce heat-resisting steel; the final war production model used
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heat-resisting steel in only the turbine blades and nozzles, and could in fact be
assembled by unskilled labor.

V. Conclusions
Viewing the two histories of turbojet development can lead to some generalized
conclusions regarding how industry and government should pursue groundbreaking
technological developments which also require expedience.
A. Technological leaps
The first conclusion is to restrain the number of individual technological leaps as
much as possible. Whittle’s design was groundbreaking—no one before him had
seriously advocated the use of a gas turbine power plant in an aircraft—yet in
manufacture, he used an assemblage of relatively conventional components to achieve
his goal, innovating on a component level only when necessary. Ohain, too, understood
how to simplify a design to the bare minimum in required complexity; his first
prototypes were made largely of sheet metal. However, the larger German industry took
up his work so broadly that his influence could not reach all developers, and the
industry forgot his example of simplicity in the pursuit of a functional end product.
Expediency demands that conservative approaches be taken wherever possible but
German industry neglected this consideration in their use of axial compressors. They
were absolutely correct that an axial compressor was (and is generally to this day) a
superior design choice for a turbojet. However, they failed to adequately estimate the
extra research and development which would have to be poured into the overall project
as a result. Whittle’s original patent even called for an axial compressor, but he gave it
up when faced with funding limitations, settling reasonably on what amounted to a
modified supercharger. Both countries’ turbojets were the culmination of design
concessions for the sake of deployment; some key differences in finished quality result
from the fact that Britain’s engines were designed from the beginning with a sense of
expedient technical compromise, while German engineers realized only later in the war
that they would not have the time they expected to perfect their designs, or even the
materials they had taken for granted.
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Framed a different way, this point could be defined as ‘minimize the number of
variables that must be arranged.’ Britain’s centrifugal compressors were machines
whose manufacture and operating characteristics were generally understood already; if
some operating parameter needed to be changed, it is likely that redesign was a
relatively minor issue (though the compressor itself did have to be replaced entirely). By
contrast, Germany’s use of axial compressors stepped into the metaphorical deep end of
design variables, for merely one component. The interaction of rotor and stator blading
was not yet understood—the one engine which used a 50% reaction design was
discarded—and many problems regarding the blades themselves were encountered,
usually due to harmonic vibration issues which caused the failure of many compressors.
As earlier referenced, the first Me 262 test flight was nearly a disaster due to
simultaneous compressor failure in both turbojet engines (fortunately, the craft was a
testbed that still had a piston engine installed in the nose).
B. Use of panels for funding decisions
The second conclusion is to never allow new ideas which reach government
funding agencies to have their fate determined by the opinion of one ‘expert’. If an idea
is truly groundbreaking, it’s possible that no true expert may exist at all (as was the case
in Britain) or, as is the case with anything human, that there may well be a personal
bias. This problem does not, in truth, exist so much today as it did then. Between the
wider availability of experts via ease of modern contact and the general use of
committees or panels to determine project funding, it is unlikely that such a blunder as
the Air Ministry’s 1929 refusal to support Whittle’s work based on one expert’s opinion
would be repeated today. However, it is such a painful error that the caution bears
repeating; had Britain possessed a functional turbojet engine during the early war
period, years of bloodshed could likely have been avoided due to the Allies’ crushing air
superiority.
C. Intra-institutional support
The third conclusion is to ensure that personnel within organizations or services
are supported in their development work, as Whittle was supported within the RAF.
Such tacit support of an inventor can be crucial, particularly in the early stages when no
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explicit funding is available for their work; some 3 years passed between Whittle’s initial
enrollment in Cambridge (funded by the RAF) and the first receipt of official
government funding for his work. Once Whittle completed his post-graduate year at
Cambridge in 1937, he remained on the Special Duty List by permission of the RAF until
his retirement in 1946, solely for work on the turbojet engine. Despite not being on
active duty for eleven years, the RAF wisely supported him continuously throughout,
recognizing his superior potential.

D. Support of original developer(s)
The fourth conclusion is to support the person, group, or company that originally
develops an idea, regardless of whether or not they possess prior experience in the field
their development falls into. Britain failed to do this for Whittle on several occasions,
first by dismissing his design in part because he lacked design experience for any kind of
engine, then by tacitly allowing Rover to steal one of Whittle’s designs and secretly
modify it for their own use, and finally by nationalizing Power Jets and subsequently
prohibiting the company from further engine manufacture. Germany, too, nearly did the
same thing to Heinkel; despite the fact that they were the first company to enjoy
successful development of a turbojet engine, they were solely an established airframe
manufacturer. Had Heinkel been unable to acquire an engine manufacturer, RLM
funding would likely have been cut off to the first group to actually succeed in Germany.
If an inventor has the wherewithal to strike out in a new direction (and it works),
they must be accorded respect enough that their development isn’t taken out of their
hands and given to ‘more qualified’ groups for further growth.
E. Consistency in administrative course
The fifth conclusion is to maintain commitments to funding and official support.
While Britain never reversed an official decision of support, Germany did so on several
occasions. Even if the project itself lives through the uncertainty, it stands to reason that
its quality will suffer regardless; those working on the project are unlikely to maintain
morale and, consequently, quality of work between the ebb and flow of purpose. In the
case of Germany’s wavering between support for experimental development of
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turbojets, resources were unquestionably squandered on further production of defunct
piston-powered engines.

Appendix
Following this paper are photographs of relevant museum exhibits encountered
while on research travel in the UK and Germany.
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Rear view of Whittle Unit (WU) first-ever turbojet

Rear view of W.1 turbojet

Front view of WU

Front view of W.1 turbojet

Gloster E.28/39, single-engine testbed for W.1
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W.2B/500 engine, powerplant for Gloster Meteor

Front view of BMW 003 turbojet

Gloster Meteor, sole British jet fighter of WWII

Rear view of BMW 003 turbojet

Junkers Jumo 004B turbojet, first-ever to see service
and typical powerplant for Messerschmitt Me 262

Messerschmitt Me 262, first operational jet fighter,
powered by either Jumo 004 or BMW 003 engines
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